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Abstract: 
 
 
What types of asylum-seekers are Europeans willing to accept? We conducted a 
conjoint experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in fifteen European countries to 
evaluate 180,000 profiles of asylum-seekers that randomly varied on nine 
attributes. Asylum-seekers who have higher employability, have more consistent 
asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are Christian rather than 
Muslim receive the greatest public support. These results suggest that public 
preferences over asylum-seekers are shaped by sociotropic evaluations of their 
potential economic contributions, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness 
of their claims, and anti-Muslim bias. These preferences are similar across 
respondents of different age, education, income, and political ideology, and across 
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the surveyed countries. This public consensus on what types of asylum-seekers to 
accept has important implications for theory and policy. 
 
Summary: A large-scale experiment reveals how economic, humanitarian, and 
religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum-seekers. 
 
 
Europe currently faces the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War. In 2015, Europe 
received approximately 1.3 million new asylum claims (1), and many more people are expected to flee 
to Europe as conflicts in the Middle East and other regions linger on. The number of migrants 
trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea who have been reported missing or dead totaled 
3,771 in 2015 alone (2), and this number is likely to be higher in 2016 as asylum-seekers embark 
on new and even more dangerous routes to Europe after the implementation of the refugee deal 
between the European Union and Turkey (3). 
As more and more people flee war-torn countries and persecution, refugee-receiving democracies 
must confront a fundamental challenge: how to honor international commitments—including 
treaties like the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention—to process asylum claims and provide 
shelter to accepted refugees, while at the same time developing asylum policies that are supported by 
domestic voters. 
As Fig. 1 shows, there is considerable heterogeneity in the exposure of European countries to the 
asylum crisis. While some countries, like Germany and Sweden, process a large number of asylum 
applications per capita, others, like the United Kingdom and Czech Republic, share a comparatively 
small responsibility. Yet the migrant crisis has been so severe that it has resulted in political conflict 
and social tensions widely across Europe, including extreme right-wing parties mobilizing citizens 
around asylum issues (4), frequent arson attacks on asylum centers (5), and the partial closing of 
Schengen borders. 
As the crisis threatens national solidarity, the social contract, and continental unity, European 
policymakers face increasing public pressure to find policy solutions. While public preferences may 
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not always directly translate into policies, a sizable political science literature has shown that in 
democratic countries, particularly salient and high-profile public policies often respond markedly to 
public opinion (6–8). In the context of this study, a case in point is the recent “Brexit” referendum in 
the United Kingdom (UK) in which the public voted for the UK to exit the European Union, a decision 
that has been attributed to rising anti-immigrant backlash in the UK (9). And while public opinion is a 
crucial factor, a key problem for both academic scholars and policymakers alike is a lack of 
knowledge as to why some native-born citizens oppose and others support the welcoming of particular 
asylum-seekers. 
 
FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
A large literature has examined public attitudes toward immigrants (10), ethnic minorities (11), 
and Muslims (12, 13) in general, but far fewer studies have looked at attitudes toward asylum-seekers 
(14–21). These latter studies have provided important insights into the correlates of anti-asylum-
seeker sentiment, but either they are limited to particular countries, or they rely on observational data 
from standard survey questions that ask about asylum-seekers in general and do not use experiments to 
differentiate between different types of asylum-seekers (22). Furthermore, they have mostly been 
conducted prior to the current asylum crisis. There still exists very little systematic and experimental 
evidence to inform the heated ongoing political debates over asylum policies with the voice of 
European voters. In particular, we lack a comprehensive assessment that captures which particular types 
of asylum-seekers the European public is willing to accept given the current crisis. 
To provide such an assessment, we designed a conjoint experiment and embedded it in a large-
scale online public opinion survey that we fielded in fifteen European countries (23). We used entropy 
balancing (24) to reweight our sample data to match the demographic margins from the populations 
of each country. Details about the sample, design, and statistical analysis can be found in the Materials 
and Methods section of the Supplementary Materials (SM) (25). All analyses, except otherwise noted, 
were prespecified in a preregistered analysis plan made available at the Political Science 
Registered Studies Dataverse (http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YUNKUL). 
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Conjoint experiments ask subjects to evaluate hypothetical profiles with multiple, randomly varied 
attributes and are widely used in marketing and increasingly in other social science fields to 
measure preferences and the relative importance of structural determinants of multi-dimensional 
decision-making (26,27). Specifically, we used a conjoint experiment to ask 18,000 European eligible 
voters to evaluate 180,000 profiles of asylum-seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes that asylum 
experts and the previous literature have identified as potentially important (28). This design allows us 
to test which specific attributes generate public support for or opposition to allowing asylum-seekers 
to stay in the host country and how this willingness varies across different groups of eligible voters, 
countries, and types of asylum-seekers. 
Fig. 2 plots the effects of the asylum-seeker attributes on the probability of acceptance pooling 
across all respondents (29). The results demonstrate that European voters do not treat all asylum-
seekers equally. Instead, the willingness to accept asylum-seekers varies strongly with the specific 
characteristics of the claimant. In particular, preferences over asylum-seekers appear to be structured 
by three main factors: economic concerns, humanitarian concerns, and anti-Muslim sentiment. 
 
 
FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Asylum-seekers who previously worked in higher skill occupations—such as doctors, teachers, and 
accountants—are about 13 percentage points, 9 percentage points, and 8 percentage points more 
likely to be accepted compared to asylum-seekers who have been previously unemployed. We find a 
similar but smaller premium of about 5-6 percentage points for asylum-seekers who worked in lower 
skill occupations, such as farmers or cleaners, compared to those who were unemployed. Respondents 
also attach high importance to language skills, with asylum-seekers being about 12 percentage 
points less likely to be accepted when they do not speak the host-country language than when they 
speak it fluently. Those who have limited host-country language proficiency face a penalty of 6 
percentage points. Moreover, asylum-seekers who are close to retirement age (62 years) are about 6 
percentage points less likely to be accepted than young applicants (21 years). Overall, these results 
suggest that evaluations of the expected economic contribution or potential economic burden of 
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asylum-seekers play an important role in structuring asylum preferences. 
Asylum-seekers who apply because of fear of political, religious, or ethnic persecution are about 
15 percentage points more likely to be accepted compared to those who migrate to seek better 
economic opportunities. Asylum-seekers are also about 11 percentage points less likely to be accepted 
when they have major inconsistencies in their asylum testimony, compared to when they have no 
inconsistencies. Moreover, those who have been the victim of torture are over 11 percentage points 
more likely to be accepted than are those with no special vulnerabilities. Taken together, these results 
suggest that public preferences are also highly sensitive to humanitarian concerns about the 
deservingness and legitimacy of the asylum request, as well as the severity of the claimants’ 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, the public is opposed to admitting asylum-seekers whose principal 
motivation is to seek better economic opportunities and therefore might be regarded as economic 
migrants who do not meet the legal definition of refugee status according to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
We also find that religion matters: Muslim asylum-seekers are about 11 percentage points less 
likely to be accepted compared to otherwise similar Christian asylum-seekers. This penalty is sizable 
and larger than the penalty applied to unemployed asylum-seekers versus teachers. Moreover, the 
fact that Christian asylum-seekers are only slightly preferred over Agnostic asylum-seekers 
suggests that the penalty mostly reflects a strong anti-Muslim bias, rather than a pro-Christian bias. As 
we show later, this penalty is not uniform across respondents but rather doubles in size for respondents 
who place themselves on the right of the political spectrum, compared to those on the left. These 
results suggest that anti-Muslim sentiment is a third important factor that structures asylum 
preferences. 
Lastly, once the other attributes are controlled for, the country of origin of an asylum-seeker plays 
only a minor role in generating support. Asylum-seekers from Kosovo are least likely to be accepted, 
those from Syria and the Ukraine are most likely to be accepted, and those from Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Pakistan, and Eritrea fall in between. However, the differences are small in substantive terms; the 
maximum difference is only 4 percentage points between the most and least popular origin. 
Do the effects of the attributes vary across different types of asylum-seekers? For instance, based 
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on psychological research on decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (30), we might expect 
that respondents rely more on their biases when evaluating profiles where the legitimacy of the claim is 
ambiguous. This suggests an interaction such that the anti-Muslim bias would be strongest when the 
applicant’s asylum testimony has minor inconsistencies, rather than no inconsistencies or major 
inconsistencies. However, we find no substantively meaningful first-order interactions among any of 
the conjoint attributes, suggesting that the economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns are 
powerful determinants of attitudes toward asylum-seekers across all types of profiles (31). 
How do asylum preferences vary across different types of voters? In order to test for interactions 
between respondent characteristics and the effects of the asylum-seeker attributes, we stratify the 
main analysis by voters’ political ideology, age, education, and income. Fig. 3 reports the results. 
Overall, we find that the effects of the attributes are broadly similar across the different subgroups, 
suggesting that there is a general consensus—among left- and right-wing, young and old, less and 
more highly educated, and richer and poorer voters—on which asylum-seekers are preferred (32). 
This effect homogeneity across subgroups also suggests that the concerns about employability are 
caused by sociotropic economic evaluations, meaning that respondents are concerned about the 
economic impact on the host country as a whole. This is in contrast to egocentric economic concerns, 
which pertain to the impact on the respondents’ personal economic situation. If evaluations were 
shaped by egocentric concerns, we would have expected that preferences vary considerably given 
that different types of asylum-seekers will differently affect a respondent’s personal economic 
situation. For example, highly educated respondents should be more concerned about job competition 
from high skilled asylum-seekers, and lower educated respondents should be more concerned about 
competition from low skilled asylum-seekers. Similarly, given progressive tax systems, richer 
respondents should be more concerned about the welfare burden imposed by unemployed asylum-
seekers than poorer respondents. 
 
FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
There is, however, a notable exception to this effect homogeneity: The top-left two panels of Fig. 
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3 show that respondents on the left exhibit stronger humanitarian concerns and weaker anti-Muslim 
bias than voters on the right. First, the premium for asylum-seekers with special vulnerabilities (e.g., 
victims of torture) and penalty for asylum-seekers who migrated in search of economic opportunities 
are both larger among voters on the left than among those on the right. For instance, among voters on 
the right, economically motivated asylum-seekers are about 13 percentage points less likely to be 
accepted than those who migrated for fear of political persecution. In contrast, this effect is 19 
percentage points for voters on the left (the difference in effects between the left and the right is 
significant at p-value < 0.0001). This suggests that while humanitarian concerns are shared among 
both the left and the right, those concerns play a somewhat stronger role in structuring attitudes 
toward asylum-seekers for the left. Second, while the anti-Muslim bias exists among both left- and 
right-wing voters, the bias is about twice as large in the latter group (14 versus 7 percentage points, a 
difference that is significant at p- value < 0.0001). A more fine-grained analysis (33) shows that the 
anti-Muslim bias increases roughly monotonically moving from the left to the right of the ideological 
spectrum. Further analysis (34) also shows that anti-Muslim sentiment is virtually constant across 
respondents with different levels of empathy. This suggests that the responses are unlikely to be 
driven by social desirability bias given the correlation between empathy and social desirability scales 
found in psychology research (35, 36). 
The fifteen surveyed countries exhibit major differences with regard to several potentially relevant 
factors for shaping domestic asylum preferences, such as the previous influx of immigrants, the 
number of asylum applications per capita (cf. Fig. 1), the existence of an EU external border, the 
generosity of their welfare states, their economic strength and levels of unemployment, and other 
general political and economic characteristics that impact the number of asylum-seekers they can 
integrate. Fig. S2 in the SM shows that despite these differences, the asylum preferences follow a 
similar pattern across the fifteen surveyed countries. The partial exceptions include that the magnitude 
of the anti-Muslim bias varies somewhat, and the penalty against asylum-seekers who migrate for 
economic reasons is somewhat smaller in poorer countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Poland) compared to richer countries (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland). 
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This consensus on what types of asylum-seekers are preferred also has cross-country implications 
for the average number of asylum-seekers accepted, based on a dichotomized version of a rating 
variable that distinguishes between accepted and rejected profiles (37). Fig. 4 shows the percent of 
asylum-seekers accepted by country. In most countries, the fraction of accepted asylum-seeker profiles 
is close to the average of 45% accepted in the pooled European sample (38). This suggests that 
despite the major differences between the countries, there is a considerable consensus in terms of 
not only the types but also the overall number of asylum-seekers that should be admitted. 
Furthermore, only a small percentage of respondents—9% overall and less than 14% in every 
country—categorically rejected all ten of their asylum-seeker profiles (39). 
 
FIG. 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
This study examined the impact of different asylum-seeker attributes on generating public support 
for granting asylum. We conducted a large-scale conjoint experiment and asked 18,000 voters in fifteen 
European countries to evaluate profiles of asylum-seekers that randomly varied on multiple attributes. 
We find that asylum-seekers have a higher probability of being accepted when they are more 
employable and skilled, possess special vulnerabilities, have more consistent asylum claims, and are 
Christian rather than Muslim. Furthermore, these effects are strikingly similar across 
sociodemographic subgroups and countries. Additional analysis reported in the SM also reveals that 
all the findings are similar regardless of whether we use a rating or choice outcome to evaluate the 
asylum-seeker profiles (40). Finally, the results are similar across all five evaluation tasks asked of 
each respondent and when comparing respondents above and below the median time of survey 
completion (this test was not prespecified), suggesting that the results are not diluted by survey fatigue 
(41). 
While the experimental design of our study (i.e., the randomization of attributes) ensures its internal 
validity, as with all survey studies there are potential external validity issues. However, four factors 
help to alleviate concerns about the external validity of our study. First, the one external validation 
test that we are aware of has shown that the paired conjoint design we employ can achieve high external 
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validity in reducing social desirability bias and replicating real-world voting behavior (42). Second, 
the number of profiles that each respondent accepted in their conjoint tasks, based on their ratings 
of the profiles, is highly correlated with respondents’ general attitudes toward asylum-seekers as 
measured by an additional question in our survey that asked respondents whether they want to 
decrease or increase the number of people granted asylum in their country (43). This suggests that 
respondents’ judgments of individual cases are closely linked to their support for broader asylum 
policies. Third, given the homogeneity of the results across the countries and subgroups of 
respondents, it is unlikely that our results would have been substantially different had our sample 
contained different distributions on age, gender, education, or income—and in fact, the results are 
similar if we do not employ reweighting for the analysis (44). Fourth, as already noted, the vast 
majority of respondents in all surveyed countries neither categorically rejected nor categorically 
accepted all of their asylum-seeker profiles, suggesting that our findings on how voters condition their 
support based on specific asylum-seeker attributes has broadly meaningful implications for European 
public attitudes toward asylum-seekers, rather than being applicable only on the margins. 
These findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of public opinion on 
asylum-seekers and migrants more generally. Mirroring the findings from research on the drivers of 
general anti-immigrant sentiment, we find strong evidence that sociotropic economic evaluations are 
shaping attitudes toward asylum-seekers. In addition, we also find that humanitarian concerns with 
regard to asylum-seekers’ deservingness and vulnerability play a major role. Given that the sizable 
literature on immigration attitudes has largely ignored humanitarian concerns as a central explanatory 
factor (45), our results suggest that humanitarian concerns might be particularly important for 
structuring attitudes toward asylum-seekers. Moreover, the finding of general agreement across 
different subsets of the population on which asylum-seekers should be admitted echoes a similar 
consensus identified in previous research on American attitudes toward immigrants more broadly (46). 
However, to the extent that the respondents on the left exhibit a weaker anti-Muslim bias and place 
stronger emphasis on humanitarian considerations, our analysis also discovers new heterogeneity in 
attitudes toward migrants across the left-right ideological spectrum. 
Our study also has important implications for policy. We find mixed evidence on the extent to 
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which public preferences reflect the requirements of international law. It is important to note that all 
fifteen countries included in the study are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. This United 
Nations treaty commits its parties to granting asylum to persons with legitimate claims, which 
include asylum-seekers who face political, religious, or ethnic persecution in their home countries. 
In light of these obligations, the results of our study can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, 
the results suggest that European policymakers are confronted with a disjuncture between public 
opinion and international legal norms (47, 48). The fact that our respondents exhibit anti-Muslim bias 
and a preference for higher employability, even when evaluating legally legitimate asylum-seekers 
who face persecution, is at odds with the legal requirements that asylum not be given on the basis 
of religion or professional skills. On the other hand, the results reveal that humanitarian concerns 
have a pronounced effect such that asylum-seekers who face persecution, have consistent asylum 
testimonies, and have special vulnerabilities are substantially more likely to be accepted. Most 
importantly, these preferences are widely shared across countries and apply across all types of asylum-
seekers, regardless of their religion and employability. This suggests that the public has partially 
internalized the central pillars of international refugee law. 
The results also inform the ongoing debate over how to resolve the current refugee crisis. In 
particular, they illuminate both challenges and opportunities for policymakers who are struggling to 
meet their legal responsibilities to protect refugees while simultaneously respecting the public will on 
this salient and divisive issue. The public’s strong anti-Muslim bias and preference for highly skilled 
asylum-seekers who can speak the language of the host country points to a mounting challenge for 
solving the current crisis and successfully integrating asylum-seekers, given that most asylum-seekers 
currently originate from Muslim-majority countries and may lack the desired professional and 
language skills. Yet at the same time, the fact that the European public shares common humanitarian 
and sociotropic concerns suggests a clear narrative to increase support for accepting refugees. If the 
goal is to alleviate the social tensions of the current refugee crisis and generate more public 
acceptance of asylum-seekers, European policymakers have an opportunity to highlight refugees’ 
deservingness and vulnerability as well as their economic contributions to their host societies. 
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Fig. 1. Asylum applications per 1,000 local population, 2015. There is large heterogeneity in the 
number of asylum applications per capita in 2015 across the surveyed countries: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Source: (49, 50) 
 
Fig. 2. Effects of asylum-seeker characteristics on respondents’ attitudes. The figure shows the 
effects of the attributes on the probability of accepting the asylum-seeker. Dots with horizontal lines 
indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals from linear (weighted) least 
squares regression. The unfilled dots on the zero line denote the reference category for each asylum-
seeker attribute. Table S9 (Model 1) in the SM displays the underlying regression results. 
 
Fig. 3. Effects of asylum-seeker characteristics on respondents’ attitudes across subgroups. The effects 
of the various asylum-seeker attributes are similar across different sociodemographic subgroups, 
stratified by ideology (top-left, green panels), age (top-right, blue panels), education (bottom-left, 
orange panels), and income (bottom-right red panels). Dots with horizontal lines indicate point 
estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals from linear (weighted) least squares 
regression. The unfilled dots on the zero line denote the reference category for each asylum-seeker 
attribute. This analysis has not been specified in the pre-analysis plan. Table S10 in the SM displays the 
underlying regression results, and Table S3 in the SM describes how the subset variables were coded.  
 
Fig.  4.  Percent of accepted asylum-seeker profiles by country.  The figure shows that the percent 
of accepted asylum-seeker profiles is quite similar across countries.  Corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals are also shown. 
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